

**PROJECT DOCUMENT****Libya****Project Title: Developing a National Prevention of Violent Extremism Framework for Libya****Project Number: 00129361****Implementing Partner: UNDP****Start Date: 1 October 2021****End Date: 30 June 2023****Brief Description**

The political and socio-economic structural challenges plaguing Libya since 2011 have established a favorable environment for the development of VE groups, who present a persisting threat to the everyday security of the Libyan populace. VE groups will likely continue to pose a challenge to the country's stability while the underlying, multi-faceted drivers of radicalization and recruitment into VE groups remain unaddressed.

Within this context, the Counter Terrorism Unit of the Presidential Council (CTU-PC) has invited UNDP Libya to support the expansion of the Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) component of its Counter-Terrorism (CT) Strategy created in 2020. As such, this proposal aims to deepen this burgeoning partnership and support the Government of Libya to develop a comprehensive national PVE framework (strategy and accompanying action plan), in addition to a coordination mechanism to link the PVE framework at the national level with its corresponding and complementary components at the local level.


The project's overall objective is to enable Libyan authorities to more effectively address the root causes and structural drivers of VE in the country. By adopting a cohesive, inclusive, and rights-based approach to PVE, the national government and other stakeholders will be able to enhance the population's resilience to VE and prevent its further spread, ultimately increasing stability and security in the country. It is expected to deliver the following outcomes:

- Outcome 1:** The Government of Libya has a consolidated National PVE Framework (strategy and implementable action plan) in line with international best practices and human rights commitments, and is supported by UNDP throughout the design, implementation, and evaluation process with critical technical expertise, research and learning.
- Outcome 2:** Municipalities in Libya are supported to develop and implement PVE strategies tailored to their local context that are also aligned with the national framework.
- Outcome 3:** Structures are in place that effectively enhance coordination and information flows between national and local actors working on PVE in Libya.

The Project builds on UNDP ongoing PVE programming in Libya, which is envisioned to feed into and support national-level efforts, as well as the organization's extensive technical subject matter expertise and experience providing support to national governments and communities to prevent VE around the world.

Total resources required:	USD 300,000	
Total resources allocated:	UNDP	
	Netherlands	
	Government of Libya:	
	In-Kind:	
Unfunded:	USD	

Agreed by

UNDP
Represented By: Deputy Resident Representative Programme
 20/9/2021
Print Name: Christopher Laker

I. DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE

Since the overturning of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, Libya has seen a rise of violent extremist groups supported by both foreign and domestic actors including Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and affiliated groups such as Ansar al-Sharia—and even become a strategic hub for their activities. Although these extremist forces have publicly ejected from former strongholds such as Derna and Sirte by the Libyan Arab Armed Forces and the Government of National Accord (in the case of the later), and faced strong opposition from local populations in these cities,¹ they continue to persist and represent a significant threat to stability and security in Libya. ² The UN Security Council has estimated that there may be as many as 1,400 Islamic State fighters in Libya in 2020. According to the same report, although these are primarily concentrated in Libya’s Fezzan region, ISIL also maintains sleeper cells in coastal cities including the capital. These VE groups have perpetrated terrorist attacks throughout Libya targeting both domestic and international actors, including at military checkpoints, police stations, embassies, and local businesses.³ Libyans have also supported the activities of armed VE groups abroad. In 2013 Libya was among the top five countries sending fighters to Syria.⁴

Broader political and socio-economic structural challenges plaguing the country since 2011 have established a favorable environment for both the development of VE groups and the radicalization of Libyans.⁵ A growing body of literature has documented the prevalence and severity of various VE drivers in Libya at the ‘macro’ national level, the ‘meso’, or community level, as well as the ‘micro’, or individual level. This includes an ongoing study commissioned by UNDP Libya, which has identified how governance failures and political grievances are key drivers of VE. Limited opportunities to influence change through non-violent civic participation has contributed to disillusionment with the current political system—in particular of youth— leading “individuals to seek out alternative options to change their circumstances.”⁶ Widespread corruption has also fuelled disaffection with the government—with Libya ranking 173rd / 179 on Transparency International’s 2020 Corruption Perception Index.⁷⁸

Furthermore, the weak Libyan central government’s limited ability to provide effective public services—including security, health, electricity, water, and solid waste management—administer justice, or consolidate rule of law in the face of the proliferation of armed groups and widespread availability of weapons, domestic political divisions, extensive foreign meddling, and prolonged

¹ Alia Brahim and Jason Pack, ‘Strategic Lessons from the Ejection of ISIS from Sirte’, Atlantic Council, (2017), <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/strategic-lessons-from-the-ejection-of-isis-from-sirte/>.

² UN Security Council Committee Concerning Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL) and Al-Qaida, (2020), see <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N20/161/47/PDF/N2016147.pdf?OpenElement>.

³ Inga Kristina Trauthig, “Islamic State in Libya: From Force to Farce?”, International Centre for the Study of Radicalization, Kings College, 2020. <https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/ICSR-Report-Islamic-State-in-Libya-From-Force-to-Farce.pdf>

⁴⁴ Aaron Y. Zelin, “ICSR Insight: Up to 11,000 Foreign Fighters in Syria; Steep Rise among Western Europeans,” International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, King’s College London, December 17, 2013, <http://icsr.info/2013/12/icsr-insight-11000-foreign-fighters-syria-steep-rise-among-western-europeans/>.

⁵ ‘Prevention of Violent Extremism in Libya: Preliminary Assessment’, United Nations Development Program, (2021).

⁶ Mercy Corps and the Governance Network. ‘Beyond Gaddafi: Libya’s governance context’ (2011), p.7 and Jean-Louis Romanet Perroux, ‘The Deep Roots of Libya’s Security Fragmentation’ *Middle Eastern Studies* (2019) 55:22, pp. 200-224. Cited in: UNDP, ‘Preventing Violent Extremism in Libya’ p. 18.

⁷ Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perceptions Index’, (2020), <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020/index/nzl> Cited in: UNDP, ‘Preventing Violent Extremism in Libya’.

⁸ The 2017 UNDP study identified experience of bribe-paying to state officials as a key indicator of disaffection with government among the voluntary VE recruits in Africa. See: “Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives and The Tipping Point for Recruitment” United Nations Development Program, (2017).

conflict has fuelled the public's low confidence in local and national political institutions. These factors have contributed to administrative atomization, where "local state and non-state authorities are left alone to govern the country at the local level without sufficient resources from the national government, and often with very little human and infrastructural capacity."⁹ A generalized socio-economic struggle, due in part due to the poor provision of services in spite of the country's wealth of natural oil resources, is exacerbated by limited formal economic opportunities outside of the public sector, which can be attributed to the poorly diversified economy and underdeveloped private sector. The COVID-19 pandemic has further impacted many Libyans' livelihoods. These challenges have particularly affected vulnerable communities in the areas Libya's southern borderland characterized by the relative absence of the state, who have had higher rates of multi-dimensional poverty, unemployment and underemployment, disenfranchisement, and constant cycles of conflict and insecurity compared to other areas of the country, contributing to a general sense of marginalization and abandonment.¹⁰

Extremist groups in Libya have exploited the public's hardship and poor living conditions arising from the unstable provision of public services, and their growing sense of alienation towards governing elites and state actors for recruitment purposes. Youth from marginalized communities are generally considered especially vulnerable to narratives that "invite them to channel such grievances and associated desperation into the cause of extremism", with the material incentives offered by VE groups presenting themselves as a way out of challenging socio-economic situations.¹¹ Within the Libyan context, VE groups have also been known to take advantage of Libya's porous border and flourishing cross-border illicit economy. This has taken the form of directly participating in illegal human, narcotics and arms trafficking, to establish checkpoints along smuggling routes, and provide protection as a means of generating income.¹² Libyans from border communities who also participate in cross-border trade—be it for legal or illegal goods—often come into direct contact with VE groups by virtue of utilizing similar routes.¹³ As such, the particular vulnerabilities of marginalized youth, especially in border communities, are thought to constitute a gateway for organized criminal and violent extremist groups to enter into and operate both in and from Libya, pointing to the need for targeted and sustained outreach to youth in at-risk communities—while simultaneously meaningfully addressing the underlying causes of their socio-political and economic grievances.

Although the 2017 UNDP study underscores the relevance of economic factors as drivers of VE recruitment, it emphasizes that poverty or economic grievances are usually not the only factor, putting emphasis on other 'tipping points' that push individuals over the edge from the 'at risk' category to voluntary VE recruits. In light of broader findings from the 2017 UNDP study on VE in other African contexts that governments' counterterrorism (CT) strategies—and the resulting violent actions of state security actors—are often explicitly identified by voluntary VE recruits as major sources of grievance, additional research on the applicability of these findings to the Libyan context is required. Regardless, studies on the Libyan context have revealed how the state's militarized strategy to respond to security challenges more broadly, and terrorism in particular, has yielded

⁹ J.R. Allen, H. Amr, D.L. Byman, V. Felbab-Brown, et al., "Empowered Decentralization: A City-based strategy for rebuilding Libya," The Brookings Institution (2019) Washington, DC. Cited in: UNDP, 'Preventing Violent Extremism in Libya', p. 4.

¹⁰ Manal Taha, 'Matriarchal and Tribal Identity, Community Resilience, and Vulnerability in South Libya', USIP, (2017), <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2017-12/sr416-matriarchal-and-tribal-identity-community-resilience-and-vulnerability-in-south-libya.pdf>.

¹¹ "Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives and The Tipping Point for Recruitment" United Nation Development Program, (2017), p. 5.

¹² Abdulrahman Al-Arabi, "Local Specificities of Migration in Libya: Challenges and Solutions", European University Institute, March 2018 and Rebecca Murray, 'Tribal War Simmers in Libya's Desert', IPS News, 11 October 2011, see, <http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/10/tribal-war-simmers-in-libyas-desert/> . Cited in: UNDP, 'Preventing Violent Extremism in Libya'.

¹³ Taha, 'Matriarchal and Tribal Identity in South Libya'.

unintended counterproductive effects.¹⁴ Ad hoc law enforcement and prosecutions, as well as inhumane treatment of inmates (including those suspected of links with terrorist groups)—which has included torture—has contributed to Libya’s official and unofficial prisons becoming recruitment sites for VE groups.¹⁵ This finding indicates that the ongoing issue of arbitrary detention and uneven commitment to due process and respect of basic human rights by state security actors as systematically documented by the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) may also serve as a further driver of VE in Libya. This underscores the urgent need for rights-based security sector reform, including “more effective oversight of human rights compliance, rule of law and state accountability”.¹⁶

The ongoing UNDP Libya study as well as a report commissioned by UN Women (UNW) Libya in 2019 have also highlighted the gendered dimensions of individual-level VE drivers in Libya, in particular the ways that masculinity plays into young men’s identity formation. Since the 2011 Revolution and resulting civil war, violent and aggressive behaviour has increasingly become viewed as “synonymous with the ‘new Libyan masculine identity’”¹⁷, aka the ‘hegemonic form’ of masculinity in Libya. This image of the ideal Libyan man—which is imparted by peers, teachers, and society as a whole—includes an ability to “fight for a new, equitable society, provide for one’s family as a breadwinner, be an excellent candidate for [heterosexual] marriage with adequate financial earnings, and adhere to conservative religious beliefs”.¹⁸ VE groups have drawn upon the increasingly aggressive hegemonic form of masculinity in Libya, and the social pressure for men to marry and become breadwinners for their families to radicalize and recruit members. This has involved offering financial incentives while invoking the logic of masculinist protection—namely, the male imperative to protect and provide for women.¹⁹ The UNW 2019 study has also shown that Libyan women who are subordinate to or dependent on male relatives in VE groups are likely to be persuaded or coerced into joining VE groups by them. However, VE groups have also directly appealed to Libyan women, including using narratives of female empowerment (although research has shown that the reality within Islamist VE groups is the opposite, and they seek to demote women to subordinate positions in society) and imagery promoting women’s central role in the organization. As such, some have joined voluntarily, incentivized by multi-dimensional ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors including to revenge the death of a family member, or to improve their economic or financial situation. In turn, women have taken on diverse roles in these organizations, including key facilitative roles as ‘teachers’ of VE ideologies, and providing intelligence.

A series of studies have identified the ways that VE groups in Libya work at the community level to develop and disseminate messages to target audiences (particularly youth) to recruit operatives—including through weaponizing particular interpretations of religious tradition and institutions and capitalizing on and manipulating gender norms.²⁰ These platforms have included using radio stations,

¹⁴ UNDP, ‘Preventing Violent Extremism in Libya’.

¹⁵ Wolfgang Putstai, ‘The End of a Country – Break-Up of Libya?’ ISPI, Analysis No. 315 (2016). Cited in: UNDP, ‘Preventing Violent Extremism in Libya’.

¹⁶ UNDP, ‘Journey to Extremism,’ p. 7.

¹⁷ Paul Ammar, ‘Middle East Masculinity Studies: Discourses of Men in Crisis Industries and Gender in Revolution’, *Journal of Middle East Women Studies* (2011): Vol.7, No. 3, pp. 36-70. Cited in UNDP, ‘Preventing Violent Extremism in Libya’, p. 19.

¹⁸ UNDP, ‘Preventing Violent Extremism in Libya’, p. 10.

¹⁹ ‘Gender Equality and Violent Extremism: A Research Agenda for Libya’, UN Women, (2019), see: <https://arabstates.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2019/11/gender-equality-and-violent-extremism-in-libya>; and UNDP, ‘Preventing Violent Extremism in Libya.’

²⁰ C. Lister. ‘Competition among Violent Islamist Extremists: Combating an Unprecedented Threat’, *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. (2016) 668(1): pp.53-70. Cited in: UNDP, ‘Preventing Violent Extremism in Libya’.

sponsoring television programs, and working through a network of religious scholars and preachers.²¹ Anecdotal evidence from a UN Women 2019 study also pointed to the role of some Libyan religious schools, also known as *madrassas*, notably those who are not subject to state oversight, in spreading ideas “promoting the adoption of extreme political, social, or religious ideals and aspirations that reject or oppose the status quo and contemporary ideas, including human rights, especially women’s human rights”.²² These schools, particularly in Libya’s south, can spread narrow interpretations of Islam while filling an education service provision gap in the absence of adequate state education infrastructure.²³ However, it should be noted that empirical findings from UNDP’s 2017 research on drivers of VE in the African context have indicated that—contrary to misconceptions that conflate VE with Islam itself—a high quality of religious education actually increases resilience to VE recruitment. This study found that since Quran’ic studies are usually only available in the complex classical Arabic, students with a poor grasp of the language depend on intermediaries to interpret religious doctrine, providing an entry point for VE groups. However, “the more substantive their own knowledge of the religion is, the readier they may be to question and engage with militant interpretations”.²⁴ Growing awareness of these dynamics and VE entry points has led to calls for a comprehensive PVE strategy in Libya that is implemented in the education system, including by incorporating critical thinking, citizenship values, respect for diversity (including of different religions, cultures, and worldviews) and nonviolent conflict resolution mechanisms within curriculums and after-school activities. Sustained exposure to ‘peace education’ will help young Libyans to build their resilience to VE propaganda and messages of intolerance by fostering improved inter-religious and cultural understanding, while providing them with critical thinking abilities and the skills to manage conflict in a productive way.

Although a growing body of literature has documented VE pathways and dynamics in Libya, the highlights and key takeaways of which are described above, there remains a need for further research on the push and pull factors of radicalization in Libya, including research tailored to the local level. Additional gender-sensitive and human security-centric research on existing sources of resilience to VE is also required to identify effective entry points for PVE programming.²⁵

²¹ UNDP, ‘Preventing Violent Extremism in Libya’.

²² UNW, ‘Gender Equality and Violent Extremism in Libya’, p. 39.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ UNDP, ‘Journey to Extremism’, 2017, p. 50.

²⁵ For example, a 2017 USIP Libya study has contended that recruitment rates in VE groups remain relatively low among the minority Tuareg and Tebu populations in spite of their high ‘at risk’ status (resulting from multi-dimensional and historical disenfranchisement in the country and frequent direct exposure to VE organizations—VEOs) due to their strong cultural identity, community values, and moderate religious beliefs. It also identified a relatively high social status and power of women in Tuareg culture, which exhibits several notable matriarchal and matrilineal qualities and customs as well as comparatively less rigid gender norms, as a major source of resilience to VE ideologies. See: Taha, ‘Matriarchal and Tribal Identity in South Libya’.

Definitions

‘Violent Extremism’ (VE) is often used interchangeably with ‘terrorism’, although these terms can be differentiated by their intentions, goals, means, results, and type of their actions (UNDP Libya, 2021). VE can be “understood primarily through a lens of an ideology with extremist attitudes, violent behavior, and strict adherence to the ideology... Violent extremists engage in violence against military and civilian targets for political, social, cultural, and economic disruption”¹ (UNDP Libya, 2021, p. 7-8). It should be noted that VE is not new or exclusive to any one belief system, geographic region, or nationality. However, Islamist forms of religious VE perpetrated by groups such as ISIL, AQ, Boko Haram, and Al-Shabab have shaped the world’s image and response to VE overall (UN, 2015).

‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ (PVE) seeks to address the underlying “conditions conducive to the spread of violent extremism. PVE focuses on methods that simultaneously respect human rights for all and the rule of law as the basis of stopping violent extremism”—essentially addressing the root causes and key drivers to prevent the further spread of VE (UNDP Libya, 2021, p. 22).

On the other hand, **‘Countering Violent Extremism’ (CVE)** is more concerned with “countering the activities of existing violent extremists” (UNDP, 2017, p. 19). Its strategies focus on “using non-coercive means to dissuade individuals or groups from violence and to mitigate recruitment for, support of, or engagement in ideologically-motivated terrorism by non- state actors” (Khan, 2015 cited in UNDP Libya, 2021, p. 22). CVE is distinct from PVE. For example, CVE would seek to examine how radicalized individuals can be rehabilitated, reintegrated into society, and used as agents of change, whereas PVE ultimately seeks to prevent radicalization from ever taking place (UNDP Libya, 2021). However, they often overlap in practice and ‘PVE’ initiatives tend to incorporate CVE objectives and work on both aspects (UNDP, 2017).

‘Counterterrorism’ (CT) refers to “military operations as well as the adoption of legislative and policing frameworks to control, repress and track terrorist activities; training, equipping and reorganizing national security forces and intelligence services; and enhancing border surveillance and checkpoints” (Mahmoud, 2016; UNDP, 2017, p. 16). Both CVE and PVE fall under the broader umbrella of the ‘Counterterrorism’ (CT) agenda, which has increasingly sought to incorporate non-military activities to disrupt the activities of VE group and address the environments which enable their expansion as part of a broader strategic approach (UNDP, 2017).

II. STRATEGY

In order to take on the challenges presented under section I of this document, the Libyan government will be supported to develop the PVE component of the CT strategy into a broader comprehensive National PVE Framework (including a PVE strategy and accompanying action plan) which serves to both strengthen the capacities of governance structures and empower communities to effectively address the multi-dimensional drivers of VE in Libya. Given the unique and varied push and pull factors throughout Libya, UNDP will also support municipalities to develop their own targeted, localized PVE strategies which are tailored to specific realities while being adaptable to changing contexts. This process will ultimately enable the Government of Libya to address the root causes and drivers of VE more effectively, ultimately leading to greater stability and security in Libya. Such an ambitious objective requires long-term commitments and investments, as well as a pragmatic multi-step approach to developing and implementing a national PVE strategy.

Achieving this objective will require a coordinated approach to the implementation of national and municipal PVE strategies, as well as to the broader activities and priorities of the growing number of actors engaged in PVE and CT in Libya. As such, UNDP will seek to develop a coordination mechanism to link the PVE framework at the national level with its corresponding and complementary components at the local level. UNDP envisages that a collaborative national-level PVE working group will contribute to defining the roles and responsibilities of the variety of actors

engaged in PVE and CT and ensure the efficient distribution of resources and capabilities across government agencies and local partners. This platform will also establish a feedback loop between relevant actors, and ultimately develop a burgeoning community of practice that will support the implementation of the PVE strategy in the long term. Separately, UNDP envisages that local level working groups, ‘Local Advisory Committees’ (LACs) will eventually be developed to feed into municipal PVE frameworks, which will ideally involve a wide range of stakeholders including members of civil society organisations (CSOs), law enforcement, religious leaders, and members of local community. Local level working groups also constitute essential channels for information sharing during the PVE strategy implementation—for example, ensuring the coordinated dissemination of CVE messaging in schools and at the municipal governance, communal and religious levels—as well as strengthening the capacities of stakeholders involved in the process. Ultimately, this will ensure cohesion, alignment, and strategic implementation of national and local level PVE efforts.

The PVE framework development process must be guided by research and existing knowledge in order to develop the most effective state response at national and local levels that respond to radicalization with more holistic methods and tools that move beyond a singular focus on security and intelligence (UNDP Libya, 2021). This will involve firstly conducting a detailed analysis of the threat, assessing the current status of P/CVE strategies that already exist, and reviewing existing relevant research on VE and PVE (Hedayah, 2016). It will also involve analyzing other existing national P/CVE strategies and drawing on good practices and lessons learned in the existing body of knowledge from other contexts to feed into the design of the PVE strategy in Libya.

Ultimately, UNDP will guide Libyan partners in the development of a national PVE strategy which sets priorities for PVE activities and concrete, measurable goals, and incorporates thoughtful monitoring and evaluation mechanisms in alignment with existing good practice. Initial priorities identified CT unit of the Presidential Council, which are also based off of the pillars of the PVE component of UNDP’s Stability, Unity, and Social Cohesion (SUSC) project:

- **Pillar 1: Education:** *Dialogue and debate, critical thinking.* Activities under the ‘education’ pillar will foster positive acceptance of ethnic, racial, and religious diversity, and will promote respect of diversity, pluralism of opinion and expression and inclusion.
- **Pillar 2: Livelihood and Engagement:** *Economic well-being of individuals.* As vulnerable members of a socio-economically challenged community may react to their environment through voluntarily joining VE or organized criminal groups (or being coerced into them), it is critical to develop key livelihood and engagement strategies aimed at preventing youth involvement with organized criminal and violent extremist groups.
- **Pillar 3: Local Governance:** *Civic participation, public services, transparency.* This will be performed with respect for, and promotion of, human rights, international humanitarian, law, and the rule of law.

Other pillars of relevance could also include (but are not limited to):

- **Potential Pillar: Security Sector Reform:** In light of key findings linking grievances with state security actors to drivers of VE, Libyan partners may wish to consider including a pillar focused on incorporating a human-security and rights-based approach within the security sector’s *modus operandi*.

Inclusive, rights-based approach and gender mainstreaming

As national PVE planning processes provide a platform for converging both understanding and prioritization across a wide range of stakeholders, UNDP will advise the national government to cultivate a wide range of multi-stakeholder partnerships and involve them throughout the process in

the design, implementation and evaluation of the national PVE strategy as well as any resulting municipal PVE strategies (see section III on ‘partnerships’ for further elaboration). The exact format and sequencing of any public consultative process will be designed in the initial stages of the project in collaboration with UNDP’s main partner, the CT unit of the Presidential Council, with whom rests the ultimate responsibility for elaborating and implementing the PVE national framework and action plan. In addition to gathering the invaluable inputs and feedback from civil society actors and youth, particularly those from affected communities, UNDP particularly recognizes the importance of promoting women’s involvement in devising P/CVE policies and strategies as mandated in UN Security Council Resolution 2242(2015), as well as those of youth. A collaborative and inclusive approach is intended to build greater communication, linkages, and trust between the national level government, local municipalities, and their citizens, while fostering greater community buy-into the process.

UNDP will encourage national counterparts to integrate a rights-based approach into all aspects of the national and municipal PVE frameworks. In light of evidence that identifies insensitively conducted CT interventions and broader governance issues as drivers of VE, strategies must ensure respect for international commitments to human rights and rule of law, citizens’ participation and protection, and accountability of security sector forces (UNDP, 2017). UNDP will also provide technical support to national partners to integrate and mainstream a holistic and intersectional approach to gender within the PVE framework development process and the strategy itself, starting with applying a gender lens to researching and designing strategies aimed at addressing VE ‘push and pull’ factors in Libya. Gender should not be conflated with ‘women’, rather it refers to the socially-constructed attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female, the roles and responsibilities expected of men and women, and the ways they relate to each other in a given time and context (UNW).²⁶ Any gender analysis must apply an intersectional lens, including a nuanced understanding of other relevant axes of identity and marginalization such as age, socio-economic status, geography, race, ethnicity, and disability.

²⁶ UN Women, <https://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/conceptsanddefinitions.htm>

Theory of Change

The theory of change argues that:

IF effective entry points for PVE are identified through consolidating knowledge about the root causes, pathways, and sources of resilience to VE in Libya, as well as best practices and lessons learned from other contexts.

IF government institutions at the national and local level develop comprehensive and evidence-based National or Municipal PVE Frameworks (Strategy and Action Plan) in line with international best practices and human rights commitments; **AND** they receive technical and capacity-building support throughout the development, implementation, monitoring and evaluation process.

AND IF structures are in place that enable information flows and coordinated action among key stakeholders working on PVE in Libya at both the national and local level.

THEN ULTIMATELY Libyan authorities will be enabled to adopt an effective and coordinated approach to addressing the root causes and structural drivers of VE in Libya **AND THEREFORE** these PVE efforts will ultimately enhance stability and security in the country.

Assumptions

The theory of change is based off of several key assumptions:

- Political will of key stakeholders to develop and implement a rights based PVE Framework;
- National and local government institutions have the required legitimacy to implement PVE Frameworks.
- Key national-level authorities are willing to coordinate with one another.
- Municipal authorities are willing to develop local PVE frameworks that align with the National PVE Framework.
- Current roadblocks in passing the budget are overcome so that government funding is available for the implementation of the national action plan and its corresponding municipal strategies at the local level.

III. RESULTS AND PARTNERSHIPS

OVERALL OBJECTIVE

The overall objective of this project is to enable the Government of Libya to address the root causes and structural drivers of VE more effectively in the country. By adopting a cohesive, inclusive, rights-based, and strategic approach to PVE, the national government and other stakeholders will be able to enhance the population's resilience to VE and prevent its further spread, ultimately increasing stability and security in the country.

To this end, the design of the proposed project is to support the Government of Libya to develop a comprehensive national PVE framework and accompanying action plan, in addition to a coordination mechanism to link the PVE framework at the national level with its corresponding and complementary components at the local level.

EXPECTED OUTCOMES

This project is expected to deliver the following outcomes:

- Outcome 1:** The Government of Libya has a consolidated National PVE Framework (strategy and implementable action plan) in line with international best practices and human rights commitments, and is supported by UNDP throughout the design, implementation, and evaluation process with critical technical expertise, research and learning.
- Outcome 2:** Municipalities in Libya are supported to develop and implement PVE strategies tailored to their local context that are also aligned with the national framework.
- Outcome 3:** Structures are in place that effectively enhance coordination and information flows between national and local actors working on PVE in Libya.

EXPECTED OUTPUTS

To achieve the outcomes stated above, the below key outputs are identified:

Output 1: National PVE Framework (Strategy and Action Plan) developed

- 1.1* Review PVE component of CT Strategy and conduct desk review of available data on PVE studies to establish a framework of PVE drivers and indicators in Libya, and corresponding programmatic avenues (PVE activities). This will include identifying the key actors/stakeholders who will be consulted and/or involved throughout the national action plan development process.
- 1.2:* Draft inception report including methodologies and approaches to develop national PVE strategy including tools, measures, process for national and local stakeholder participation, detailed workplan schedule and delivery.
- 1.3:* Develop National PVE Strategy and Action Plan, which allows for regular adaptation and updates.

- 1.4: Facilitate multi-stakeholder consultation meetings and workshops to gather input for the PVE framework.
- 1.5: Provide technical support, and capacity building, where deemed necessary, to the GoL in the implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of the National PVE Framework.
- Output 2: Local PVE Frameworks developed in participating municipalities**
- 2.1: Provide technical support, and capacity building, where deemed necessary, to Local Advisory Committees (LACs) to develop and implement municipal-level PVE strategies linked to the national PVE Strategy.
- Output 3: Coordination mechanisms linking PVE policies and activities at the national and local municipal levels developed:**
- 3.1: Establish collaborative national-level PVE working group (WG) to bring together national actors to share information, make strategic decisions, and coordinate the implementation of the National PVE Framework.
- Key participants will include the CTU-PC, the Prime Minister's Office, and relevant national ministries, with UNDP involved as an observer. PVE focal points from the Local Advisory Committees (LACs) and other relevant local-level stakeholders will be included where relevant to support the alignment of national and local PVE frameworks and their coordinated implementation.*
- 3.2: Establish LACs tasked with developing the PVE strategy and action plan and coordinating their implementation in participating municipalities.
- We envision these local level working groups will be comprised of members of municipal councils, CSOs, law enforcement, religious leaders/authorities, private sector representatives, and other local community members including women and youth.*

In sum, the above objectives and activities will allow Libyan leadership (both nationally and locally) to identify and develop systematic, actionable PVE-relevant initiatives and related technical capacities. This will facilitate, not only the coordination and implementation of Libyan PVE-related programs but will provide Libyan leaders with a coherent strategy that may be used to facilitate decision-making with respect to allocation of funding and other resources.

PARTNERSHIP

Key partners

This project is a medium-term investment in building national and local frameworks and capacities to prevent VE in Libya. UNDP will operate as the international technical and administrative partner while project ownership and leadership remains with the government of Libya at the national and municipal levels. This project requires strong Libyan ownership in order to create PVE strategies and action plans that can survive political turmoil and transitions. The below table presents the main partners in this project and their roles and responsibilities:

Partner	Role	Comments
UNDP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Mobilises and coordinates international support for this project, monitors and reports on progress ✓ Technically supports implementation of the project, maintaining an adaptable approach to adjust its involvement in response to the changing needs of the government partners ✓ Ensures that this project is synchronised and linked to other international projects in Libya, implemented by UNDP and other actors 	In order to successfully perform its responsibilities, UNDP will need funding to sustain its technical support to the project throughout the process.
Libya CTU-PC Office	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Is the highest authority that directly supervises national efforts to prevent VE. Is responsible for ensuring compliance and coordination of its implementation across different levels of government. ✓ Is the ultimate owner and guardian of this project and its long-term objective. ✓ Ensures that any required measures are taken to create a strong legal and institutional foundation for the PVE framework. ✓ Ensures that PVE is rendered a national priority and that adequate resources are allocated to establishing and operating both the national and municipal PVE strategies. ✓ Will co-lead the PVE-WG along with the PM's Office 	<p>A sustainable leadership from the Presidential Council's office requires the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Appointment of a competent and influential official as the direct supervisor/patron of the national PVE framework - Depoliticisation of the PVE agenda and action plan in order to ensure its implementation regardless of changes in the political administration - Willingness to invest resources in implementing the PVE framework and building the capacities of stakeholders involved in the implementation.
Municipalities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Develop, operationalize, and manage municipal PVE frameworks and LACs ✓ Coordinate with national and local actors for implementation ✓ Nominate a key PVE focal point in municipal councils for the LACs ✓ Make critical decisions and follow up on the implementation within their respective municipalities 	Municipal authorities will need to be provided with the mandate, resources, and capacities for effectively preventing VE within their communities.

The project's main government partner at the national level is the Counter Terrorism Unit of the Presidential Council (CTU-PC), who requested support from UNDP Libya to help develop the PVE component of their national Counter Terrorism Strategy published in November 2020 (falling under the mandate of the PC). UNDP Libya met with the CTU-PC in June 2021 to discuss the modality of future engagement regarding the development of a National PVE Framework. As such, the current project is designed in line with the results of these consultations. To formalize this partnership, the modality of future engagement between UNDP and the CTU-PC regarding the development of a National PVE Framework will be finalized in a signed MoU between UNDP and the CTU-PU.

Municipal authorities will be UNDP's key partners in this project's initiative to support the establishment of LACs and the development of municipal PVE Frameworks. Along with the CTU-PC, UNDP will mobilize its pre-existing connections with municipal councils throughout the country through its other ongoing programming. UNDP envisages that municipal councils in participating municipalities will nominate a key PVE focal point, who will be in charge of setting up and coordinating a LAC in their locality and liaising with leading PVE actors at the national level. The project will also seek to ensure that municipal stakeholders are duly included in consultations and planning of the National PVE Framework.

Other key stakeholders

In addition to working with the CTU of the PC and local authorities, the project will also need to involve other relevant government entities in the PVE-WG and the broader PVE Framework development process. Namely, the Prime Minister's Office will play an essential role in the project, particularly in elaborating the PVE Action Plan, and through their involvement in coordinating and providing oversight over the PVE efforts of national line ministries. Relevant ministries include (but not limited to): the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Local Governance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs.

However, the project will need to engage a wide range of stakeholders beyond the CTU, national ministries, and municipal councils to build local ownership and buy-in of the project over the long term, ultimately contributing to its sustainability. As detailed in section II under 'strategy', UNDP will encourage its key partners to involve civil society in the process to the greatest extent possible, both in the initial design of the national and local PVE frameworks, as well as in their implementation, monitoring, and evaluation which PVE experts have emphasized as essential to the effectiveness of PVE interventions in other contexts (UNDP 2017). This includes: the private sector (particularly small local businesses), Libyan CSOs and grassroots community-based organizations (including faith-based groups), youth groups, teachers and school administrators, and religious and tribal leaders.

Working closely with the traditional 'target populations' of PVE interventions is particularly important to avoid unintentionally contributing to the harmful stigmatization of at-risk populations, in particular youth from marginalized borderland communities. As such, UNDP envisages actively seeking the involvement of young men and women from such communities within consultation and planning processes, including through facilitating the inclusion of youth representatives in LACs and ensuring they can inform the decision-making processes so that young peoples' needs and perspectives are considered, and seeking feedback from diverse youth populations throughout the monitoring and evaluation process. As outlined in section II, UNDP will also encourage its partners to involve women to the greatest extent possible within the national and municipal framework process. Their inclusion is important for the success and community acceptance of any future efforts to prevent or counter VE (P/CVE) and would serve to further activate the informal roles that Libyan women already play in this regard, many of whom object to the gender regressive ideologies espoused by VE groups (UNW 2019). For example, women (in addition to other stakeholders such as religious and tribal leaders) will have a critical role to play in supporting the disengagement, deradicalization, and reintegration of returned former extremists within their communities, or dissuading youth from marginalized communities from engagement in VE or organized criminal groups. Women's sustained involvement is also essential from the rights-based perspective. Given the differential gendered collateral effects that both VE groups' activity and militarized state responses to VE can inflict, taking

into account women's perspectives in P/CVE programming is essential to ensure it addresses their needs. For example, women's visions of security may differ from 'traditional' state-centric perspectives in recognition that armed groups, including those affiliated with state institutions, have themselves been a major source of women's insecurity in Libya.

UNDP expects that Libyan stakeholders leading national or municipal PVE efforts may also wish to liaise with international entities such as other UN agencies or international NGOs whose work aligns with the final identified pillars of the PVE Strategy, particularly at the implementation stage. As such, the coordinators of the national PVE-WG or LACs may appoint an international liaison focal point and may wish to invite international partners to participate in the coordination mechanisms.

IV. PROJECT MANAGEMENT

As national ownership of the project is crucial, UNDP will work closely with the Counter Terrorism Unit of the Presidential Council (CTU-PC) to provide the necessary support to the planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of a comprehensive PVE Framework for Libya (Output 1), and coordinate closely with other relevant partners (as outlined in the section above) to support the implementation of Output 2. The process will be overseen by the UNDP Resident Representative and Deputy Resident Representative, with overall coordination under the PVE Project Manager.

As UNDP is the technical and administrative lead of the project, all financial resources mobilized will be channelled through the UNDP Contribution Bank Account and funds will be managed by UNDP. UNDP will also utilize applicable procurement rules and regulations. To ensure that this is done in a systematic and accountable manner, UNDP will establish a Project Board, a core project team and specialised technical experts to maximise results-delivery.

PROJECT BOARD

The Project Board is the highest governing body for the project and is composed of UNDP, the donor (the Dutch Embassy) and the Libyan government counterpart (the CTU-PC). Other stakeholders, including ministry and non-ministerial entities as well as international organisations can be included in the Project Board on a needs and case-by-case basis.

The Project Board holds six-monthly meetings hosted by the co-chairs on a rotational basis. It has the following core duties and authorities:

- ✓ Oversee overall project implementation and create enabling conditions for the project to achieve its targets.
- ✓ Review and approve project plans and budgets.
- ✓ Make strategic decisions during implementation and approve strategic changes to project plan and priorities
- ✓ Take necessary action to mobilise support and resources for the project.
- ✓ Approve project reports and information material before sharing with donors and other stakeholders.

THE CORE PROJECT TEAM

The core project team (CPT) is responsible for the day-to-day planning, implementation and monitoring of the project. The CPT is composed of a Chief Technical Advisor who also acts as project manager (international recruitment), as well as key support staff including a Consultant. Together, they perform the following core duties:

- ✓ Develop project plans and budgets.
- ✓ Build and manage collaboration between key partners, with a focus on actionable solutions.
- ✓ Ensure timely implementation of activities and achievement of targets.
- ✓ Ensure project monitoring and reporting.
- ✓ Ensure that required project adjustments are identified and remedial action is taken in a timely manner when necessary.
- ✓ Ensure that value-driven partnerships are formed, and key partners are duly involved and informed of project implementation and progress.
- ✓ Ensure that the project is resourced with the right expertise by identifying and contracting experts for short-term assignments and manage and guide the experts in their work.
- ✓ Produce timely and high-quality reports for different audiences such as the donors, the government and UNDP.
- ✓ Work on mobilising additional resources to strengthen and expand the scope and impact of the project.

TECHNICAL SPECIALISTS

The project will require different types of expertise at different points in time such as technical specialists in the fields of PVE in Local Governance, Livelihoods, Community Outreach, Education, among others. Therefore, on the advice of the core project team, the Project Board will decide on what type of expertise the project requires at any given point in time. Upon such a decision, UNDP will mobilise resources to contract national or international expert consultants with the right competencies and skill sets to fill the functions. UNDP will also seek to involve PVE experts from the UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa whenever possible.

V. APPLYING UNDP KNOWLEDGE AND INNOVATIVE APPROACHES

UNDP has worked with national governments and communities in support of the prevention of violent extremism around the world. This has resulted in extensive experience, methods, knowledge and learning—with UNDP establishing itself as a global thought leader in the field of PVE, particularly within the African context. The UNDP country office and project team will ensure that this project benefits from the experience, good practice, knowledge, tools and mechanisms developed by UNDP globally or in specific contexts. A few examples include:

- **‘Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism in Africa: A Development Approach’**:²⁷ Through this Africa-wide initiative established in 2015, UNDP has provided leadership and support to national and regional partners to deliver effective and development-

²⁷

https://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Democratic%20Governance/Local%20Governance/UNDP_RBA_Preventing_and_Responding_to_Violent_Extremism_2016-19.pdf

focused responses to challenges associated with VE in the region. One of the major outputs of this project includes what has become a leading PVE resource for practitioners and scholars in Africa. The *'Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives, and the Tipping Point for Recruitment'* study published in 2017 conducted the largest-ever number of interviews conducted with individuals formerly recruited by VE groups, the analysis of which allowed UNDP's Regional Bureau for Africa to provide insights on pathways for more effective PVE programming and policy responses.

- **Resources, tools, and guidance from UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa (RBA).** Through the RBA, UNDP is coordinating and supporting a regional wide study on the dynamics and nuances of VE groups in five targeted countries that make up the North African/ Sahel regions. The study has gathered, collated, and analyzed data on the presence of VE groups, their activities and their impact on vulnerable populations in Libya, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, and Sudan and the cross-border dynamics of this phenomena. This resource is valuable to the development of the National PVE Framework as it will better inform its strategic positioning within national and local governance structures and mechanisms. It will also provide the necessary national, regional, global perspective on VE groups and their growing and their ability – and strategies – to operate in diverse political, social, economic environments.

VI. BUILDING SYNERGIES BETWEEN DIFFERENT PROJECTS

UNDP is a prominent international partner to the government of Libya at the national and local level and has been present in the country since 1976. In order to maximise the success of this project and achievement of the envisaged outputs and outcomes, UNDP will ensure that clear synergies are created and leveraged between this project and its other ongoing programming, particularly in the area of PVE.

Most relevant is UNDP's **Stability, Unity, and Social Cohesion (SUSC)** project funded under the European Union's European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), which seeks to formally integrate and enhance synergies between four inherently complementary UNDP projects: the Stabilization Facility for Libya (SFL), Toward National Reconciliation in Libya (TNRL), the Local Elections Project (LEP) supporting the Central Committee for Municipal Council Elections (CCCME) and newly elected municipal councils and PVE.

The already ongoing PVE component of this project is envisioned to feed into and support national level efforts to prevent violent extremism. SUSC-PVE is currently conducting a study on local governance and PVE in the following municipalities: Murzuq, Al Kufra, Ghat, Sabha, Bani Walid, Misrata and Zuwara.²⁸ The initial results of the study in the Libyan context have analyzed the structural, social, and individual pre-conditions that act as push factors that drive vulnerable youths to join violent extremist groups. The data, analysis and the findings from this study lay the foundation for the follow-up activities under the SUSC-PVE, which will also provide the building blocks for the pillars of the National PVE Framework and its implementation under the National PVE Action Plan. UNDP staff working on the SUSC PVE component will be involved in the development and management of this proposed project.

²⁸ This research initiative forms part of a broader regional UNDP baseline study on PVE in the Sahel—covering Libya, Niger, Nigeria, Sudan, and Chad—which is coordinated by the Small Arms Survey (SAS), which will be used to inform future programming in the region.

In light of research findings that identify grievances related to governance and political disenfranchisement as VE drivers in Libya, this project will also explore synergies with the SFL initiatives aimed at strengthening conflict-sensitive governance in Libya and increasing community engagement in the planning of local stabilization goals and in democratic processes. Similarly, the LEP Post-Election Initiative (PEI) for newly elected municipal councils is of strong relevance to the proposed project given its work to build the capacities of local government in inclusive community participation, national and international cooperation, outreach and communication, and women's participation in governance.

Depending on the final pillars established in the National PVE Strategy, UNDP Libya will seek to coordinate and share information with other relevant UNDP projects, including its **Policing and Security Joint Program** with UNSMIL aimed at improving national capacities to advance safety and security in Tripoli, including through more effective and public-oriented policing and rule of law services. Possible future UNDP Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) initiatives may also be of relevance to this project, particularly any programming targeting vulnerable youths who may be at risk of joining VE or organized criminal groups given the specificities of the Libyan context.

VII. RESULTS FRAMEWORK

in line with international best practices and human rights commitments, and is supported by UNDP throughout the design, implementation, and evaluation process with critical technical expertise, research and learning.

Outcome 2: Municipalities in Libya are supported to develop and implement PVE strategies tailored to their local context that are also aligned with the national framework.

Outcome 3: Structures are in place that effectively enhance coordination and information flows between national and local actors working on PVE in Libya.

Outcomes	Indicators	Baselines	Targets
Outcome 1: The Government of Libya has a consolidated National PVE Framework (strategy and implementable action plan) in line with international best practices and human rights commitments, and is supported by UNDP throughout the design, implementation, and evaluation process with critical technical expertise, research and learning.	<u>Outcome 1</u> 1) Comprehensive National PVE Framework developed (Action Plan and Strategy)	1) 0	1) 1 National PVE Strategy and Action Plan successfully developed
	2) # of human rights mechanisms or commitments mentioned and/or respected within the text of National PVE Framework	2) N/A	2) TBD
	3) % of key national-level PVE stakeholders who agree in end of project feedback survey that UNDP provided adequate support ('satisfactory', 'good', or 'very good') support in the design of the National PVE Framework	3) N/A	3) 70% agree
	4) % of key national-level PVE stakeholders who agree that UNDP provided adequate support ('satisfactory', 'good', or 'very good') support in the implementation of the National PVE Framework	4) N/A	4) 70% agree
	5) % of key national-level PVE stakeholders who agree that UNDP provided adequate support ('satisfactory', 'good', or 'very good') support in the monitoring and evaluation of the National PVE Framework	5) N/A	5) 70% agree

<p>Outcome 2: Local authorities (Municipalities) in Libya are supported to develop and implement PVE strategies tailored to their local context that are also aligned with the national framework.</p>	<p><u>Outcome 2:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Municipal PVE Framework developed (Action Plan and Strategy) in targeted municipalities 2) % of key LAC stakeholders agree that UNDP provided adequate support ('satisfactory', 'good', or 'very good') support in the design of their Municipal PVE Framework 3) % of key LAC stakeholders agree that UNDP provided adequate support ('satisfactory', 'good', or 'very good') support in the implementation of their Municipal PVE Framework 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) 0 2) N/A 3) N/A 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) TBD depending on # of targeted municipalities 2) 70% agree 3) 70% agree
<p>Outcome 3: Structures are in place that effectively enhance coordination and information flows between national and local actors working on PVE in Libya.</p>	<p><u>Outcome 3:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) The existence of an operational national-level PVE coordination mechanism (PVE WG) 2) % of national PVE WG members and observers that perceive this mechanism has supported the coordination of PVE efforts and framework implementation to 'some' or a great extent (end of project feedback survey) 3) Coordination mechanisms facilitate information flows between national and local level actors 4) The existence of operational LACs in targeted municipalities 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) None 2) N/A 3) N/A 4) None 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Establishment of 1 operational national-level PVE coordination mechanism 2) 60% agree 3) National and local level actors share information through the national PVE WG on a regular basis 4) Targeted # of operational LACs TBD

EXPECTED OUTPUTS	OUTPUT INDICATORS	DATA SOURCE	BASELINE	TARGETS
Output 1: National PVE Framework (Strategy and Action Plan) developed	Desk review conducted on PVE in Libya, including an analysis of the PVE component of the CT Strategy (Activity 1.1)	Desk review document, project reports	0	1 desk review
	Stakeholder mapping completed (Activity 1.1)	Stakeholder mapping document, Project reports	0	1 stakeholder mapping
	Inception report completed (Activity 1.2)	Inception report document, Project reports	0	1 inception report
	National PVE Strategy developed (Activity 1.3)	National PVE Strategy document, Project reports	0	1 National PVE Strategy
	National PVE Action Plan developed (Activity 1.3)	National PVE Action Plan document, Project reports	0	1 National PVE Action Plan
	Technical support provided to key partners in the GoL in the design of the National PVE Framework (Activity 1.4)	Project reports, partner surveys, key informant information	None	Yes - Technical support provided
	Technical support provided to key partners in the GOL in the implementation of the National PVE Framework (Activity 1.4)	Project reports, partner surveys, key informant information	None	Yes - Technical support provided
	Technical support provided to key partners in the GoL in the monitoring and evaluation of the National PVE Framework (Activity 1.4)	Project reports, partner surveys, key informant information	None	Yes - Technical support provided
	# of representatives from the CTU-PC and other key stakeholders who benefit from capacity building initiatives (workshops, trainings) (Activity 1.4)	Project reports, attendance lists	0	TBD
Output 2: Local PVE Frameworks developed in participating municipalities	# of LACs that develop municipal PVE strategies and/or action plans	Municipal PVE Framework documents; project reports	0	TBD # of municipal PVE strategies and/or action plans developed
	# of LACs that receive technical support, such as: tailored sessions with PVE experts, are provided with tools or guidance, and/or technical feedback on local PVE frameworks (Activity 2.1)	Project reports; key informant information	0	TBD # of LACs
	# of LACs whose members and other relevant local stakeholders benefit from capacity building initiatives (workshops, trainings) (Activity 2.1)	Attendance lists; project reports; key informant information	0	TBD # of LACs

Output 3: Coordination mechanisms linking PVE policies and activities at the national and local municipal levels developed	Operational national-level PVE-WG established (Activity 3.1)	Project reports; key informant information, M&E report	0	1 operational national level PVE WG established
	# of key PVE stakeholders participating in PVE-WG (Activity 3.1)	Attendance lists; project reports; key informant information	0	TBD
	# of LACs established (Activity 3.2)	Project reports; key informant information; M&E report	0	TBD

VIII. MONITORING AND EVALUATION

In accordance with UNDP’s programming policies and procedures, the project will be monitored through the following monitoring and evaluation plan:

Monitoring Plan

Monitoring Activity	Purpose	Frequency	Expected Action
Track results progress	Progress data against the results indicators will be collected and analysed through spot checks to assess the progress of the project in achieving the agreed outputs.	Quarterly or in the frequency required for each indicator.	Slower than expected progress will be addressed by the core project team, with any considerable challenges brought to the attention of the Project Board.
Monitor and Manage Risk	Identify specific risks that may threaten achievement of intended results. Identify and monitor risk management actions using a risk log. Audits will be conducted in accordance with UNDP’s audit policy to manage financial risk.	Quarterly	Risks are identified by project management and actions are taken to manage risk. The risk log is actively maintained to keep track of identified risks and actions taken.
Learn	Knowledge, good practices and lessons will be captured regularly, as well as actively sourced from other projects and partners and integrated back into the project.	At least annually	Relevant lessons are captured by the core project team and used to inform management decisions.
Annual Project Quality Assurance	The quality of the project will be assessed against UNDP’s quality standards to identify project strengths and weaknesses and to inform management decision-making or improve the project.	Annually	Areas of strength and weakness will be reviewed by project management and used to inform decisions to improve project performance
Review and Make Course Corrections	Internal review of data and evidence from all monitoring	Semi-annually (every six months)	Performance data, risks, lessons and quality will be discussed by

	actions to inform decision making.		the project board and used to make course corrections.
Project Report	A progress report will be presented to the Project Board and key stakeholders, consisting of progress data showing the results achieved against pre-defined targets at the output level, an updated risk long with mitigation measures, and any evaluation or review reports prepared over the period.	Annually, and at the end of the project (final report)	
Project Review (Project Board)	The project's governance mechanism (i.e., project board) will hold regular project reviews to assess the performance of the project and review the Annual Work Plan to ensure realistic budgeting over the life of the project. In the project's final year, the Project Board shall hold an end-of project review to capture lessons learned and discuss opportunities for scaling up and to socialize project results and lessons learned with relevant audiences.	Semi-annually (every six months)	Any quality concerns or slower than expected progress should be discussed by the project board and management actions agreed to address the issues identified.

IX. WORK PLAN AND BUDGET ²⁹³⁰

All anticipated programmatic and operational costs to support the project, including development effectiveness and implementation support arrangements, need to be identified, estimated, and fully costed in the project budget under the relevant output(s). This includes activities that directly support the project, such as communication, human resources, procurement, finance, audit, policy advisory, quality assurance, reporting, management, etc. All services which are directly related to the project need to be disclosed transparently in the project document.

EXPECTED OUTPUTS	OUTPUT INDICATORS	PLANNED ACTIVITIES	2022				2023		Donor sources	Budget Account & Description	PLANNED BUDGET
			Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2			
Output 1: National PVE Framework (Strategy and Action Plan) developed	Desk review conducted on PVE in Libya, including an analysis of the PVE component of the CT Strategy	Activity 1.1: Conduct desk review of available data on PVE studies	x	x					Consultant	20,000	
	Stakeholder mapping completed										
	Inception report completed	Activity 1.2: Draft inception report including methodologies and approaches to develop national PVE strategy.	x	x					Consultant	15,000	
	National PVE Strategy developed	Activity 1.3: Develop National PVE Strategy and Action Plan.	x	x	x	x			Consultation; Stakeholder workshops	47,192	
	National PVE Action Plan developed										
	Technical support provided to key partners in the GoL in the design of the National PVE Framework	Activity 1.4: Provide technical support and capacity building to the GoL in the implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of the National PVE Framework.	x	x	x	x	x	x	Expert consultants/trainers	55,000	
Technical support provided to key partners in the GOL in the implementation of the National PVE Framework											
Technical support provided to key partners in the GoL in the monitoring and evaluation of the National PVE Framework											
# of representatives from the CTU-PC and other key stakeholders who benefit from											

²⁹ Cost definitions and classifications for program and development effectiveness costs to be charged to the project are defined in the Executive Board decision DP/2010/32

³⁰ Changes to a project budget affecting the scope (outputs), completion date, or total estimated project costs require a formal budget revision that must be signed by the project board. In other cases, the UNDP program manager alone may sign the revision provided the other signatories have no objection. This procedure may be applied for example when the purpose of the revision is only to re-phase activities among years.

	capacity building initiatives (workshops, trainings)										
Sub-total Activity output 1										\$137,192	
Output 2: Local PVE Frameworks developed in participating municipalities	# of LACs that develop municipal PVE strategies and/or action plans	Activity 2.1: Provide technical support and capacity building to Local Advisory Committees (LACs) to develop and implement municipal-level PVE strategies linked to the national PVE Strategy.								Consultation, training (including training materials), workshops	40,000
	# of LACs that receive technical support, such as: tailored sessions with PVE experts, are provided with tools or guidance, and/or technical feedback on local PVE frameworks				x	x	x	x			
	# of LACs whose members and other relevant local stakeholders benefit from capacity building initiatives (workshops, trainings)										
Sub-total Activity output 2										\$40,000	
Output 3: Coordination mechanisms linking PVE policies and activities at the national and local municipal levels developed	Operational national-level PVE-WG established	Activity 3.1: Establish collaborative national-level PVE working group (WG)	x	x						Expert consultant/trainers/ workshops	20,000
	# of key PVE stakeholders participating in PVE-WG										
	# of LACs established	Activity 3.2: Establish LACs tasked with developing the PVE strategy and action plan and coordinating their implementation in participating municipalities.				x	x	x		Expert consultant/trainers/ workshops	50,030
Sub-total Activity output 3										\$70,030	
Subtotal Activities Output 1 – 3										\$247,222	
Total Activities Cost (Output 1-3) (above)										\$ 247,222	
Subtotal Activities										\$247,222	
DPC ³¹	Direct Programmable Cost	x	x	x	x	x	x				\$30,556
GMS	8% of total project cost *	x	x	x	x	x	x				\$22,222
TOTAL										\$300,000	

³¹ DPC: stands for Direct Programmable Costs. In UNDP realizes cost saving by sharing across projects different support functions that are similar. These functions include e.g. procurement support, M&E, Gender, Quality Assurance and Program Support. They are calculated pro rata based on the project's volume and cost.

* The total amount of the General Management Support will be proportional to the contribution effectively paid by the Donor, as established in Art. IV of the Cost Sharing Agreement

X. RISK MATRIX AND MITIGATION MEASURES

A project that aims to build national capacities to prevent VE in a country emerging from a protracted conflict and currently undergoing a political transition must overcome a vast range of barriers and risks. Successful implementation of activities and achievement of outputs and outcomes relies on a well-elaborated plan but much more importantly; it relies on strong partnerships, financial and political commitment and access to the right expertise at the right point in time. This table presents some of the most pertinent risks and how the project partners intend to manage these risks.

Risk	Likelihood of occurrence	Impact in case of occurrence	Mitigating measures
Political: Failure to mobilise sustained buy-in from national and local authorities, which would undermine the effectiveness of implementation and coordination.	Medium to High	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Close liaison and ongoing engagement with local authorities and community groups to ensure government buy-in.
Political: Project achievements are annulled following the upcoming and future political transitions, and/or the legitimacy of current government institutions are diminished in the eyes of the public through postponement of elections.	Medium	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Attention is paid to consulting a diverse range of actors, and a solid network of partnerships is created around the project to reduce the risk of abandonment Through partnering with the CTU-PC, a bureaucratic institution that continues its work and remains relatively stable regardless of the high-level political leadership at its helm
Political: Politicization of the PVE agenda, resulting in: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Its instrumentalization aimed at limiting space for political opposition and/or civil society by national or local authorities (and/or leading to unintentional consequences in this regard) 	Medium	Medium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> UNDP will seek to encourage a technocratic rather than political approach to developing a PVE strategy and action plan through providing technical guidance aimed at incorporating best practices and lessons learned from other contexts UNDP will similarly encourage national and local authorities to adopt an inclusive approach from the beginning of the process to ensure that diverse perspectives are included early on in the strategic planning. The project will put a strong emphasis on continuous monitoring and evaluation of national and local PVE frameworks to enable Libyan partners to be able to identify to negative unintended consequences, and react accordingly

-The project as a whole or its initiatives are rejected by important stakeholders due to perceptions of political polarization.			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The project will avoid involving controversial personalities and profiles that risk contributing to perceptions of the politicization of the project
Safety and security: Social stigma and danger of engaging in PVE activities often deter key actors from connecting with vulnerable youths within a socially and economically challenged context	Medium	Medium to High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The project will create mediums and mechanisms (for a) that build the confidence and facilitate the full engagement of potential key PVE actors, both nationally and locally
Strategic: Lack of coordination, integration and alignment with similar initiatives that work toward the same overall objective may subsequently lead to a stand-alone project with no real wider (i.e., national) impact.	Medium to High	Medium to High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Support in the strategic deployment of knowledge transfer, enhanced coordination, and information analysis (i.e., thematic experts) to build capacities across national and local level lines. ▪ UNDP Libya will also continue its ongoing support to the national unification and broader Libyan political process to mitigate against potential further political divisions which may undermine strategic coordination across the country.
Operational: Failure to find required technical expertise nationally in Libya on PVE and the pillars of the National PVE Strategy	Medium	Medium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The project will seek required experts both in Libya and among the Libyan diaspora ▪ The project will also look regionally in North Africa to find experts that have the need technical expertise and experience and know the culture and language ▪ The project will ensure that commissioned international experts consolidate and transfer knowledge to the Libyan national context through providing capacity building to key stakeholders and through developing procedures and guidelines that will support the implementation of the PVE action plans in the longer term.

XI. RISK MANAGEMENT

1. UNDP as the Implementing Partner will comply with the policies, procedures and practices of the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS).
2. UNDP as the Implementing Partner will undertake all reasonable efforts to ensure that none of the [project funds]³² [UNDP funds received pursuant to the Project Document]³³ are used to provide support to individuals or entities associated with terrorism and that the recipients of any amounts provided by UNDP hereunder do not appear on the list maintained by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999). The list can be accessed via http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/aq_sanctions_list.shtml. This provision must be included in all sub-contracts or sub-agreements entered into under this Project Document.
3. Social and environmental sustainability will be enhanced through application of the UNDP Social and Environmental Standards (<http://www.undp.org/ses>) and related Accountability Mechanism (<http://www.undp.org/secu-srm>).
4. UNDP as the Implementing Partner will: (a) conduct project and program-related activities in a manner consistent with the UNDP Social and Environmental Standards, (b) implement any management or mitigation plan prepared for the project or program to comply with such standards, and (c) engage in a constructive and timely manner to address any concerns and complaints raised through the Accountability Mechanism. UNDP will seek to ensure that communities and other project stakeholders are informed of and have access to the Accountability Mechanism.
5. All signatories to the Project Document shall cooperate in good faith with any exercise to evaluate any program or project-related commitments or compliance with the UNDP Social and Environmental Standards. This includes providing access to project sites, relevant personnel, information, and documentation.
6. UNDP as the Implementing Partner will ensure that the following obligations are binding on each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient:
 - a. Consistent with the Article III of the SBAA [*or the Supplemental Provisions to the Project Document*], the responsibility for the safety and security of each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient and its personnel and property, and of UNDP's property in such responsible party's, subcontractor's and sub-recipient's custody, rests with such responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient. To this end, each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient shall:
 - i. put in place an appropriate security plan and maintain the security plan, taking into account the security situation in the country where the project is being carried;
 - ii. assume all risks and liabilities related to such responsible party's, subcontractor's and sub-recipient's security, and the full implementation of the security plan.
 - b. UNDP reserves the right to verify whether such a plan is in place, and to suggest modifications to the plan when necessary. Failure to maintain and implement an appropriate security plan as required hereunder shall be deemed a breach of the responsible party's, subcontractor's and sub-recipient's obligations under this Project Document.

³² To be used where UNDP is the Implementing Partner

³³ To be used where the UN, a UN fund/program or a specialized agency is the Implementing Partner

- c. Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient will take appropriate steps to prevent misuse of funds, fraud or corruption, by its officials, consultants, subcontractors and sub-recipients in implementing the project or program or using the UNDP funds. It will ensure that its financial management, anti-corruption and anti-fraud policies are in place and enforced for all funding received from or through UNDP.
- d. The requirements of the following documents, then in force at the time of signature of the Project Document, apply to each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient: (a) UNDP Policy on Fraud and other Corrupt Practices and (b) UNDP Office of Audit and Investigations Investigation Guidelines. Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient agrees to the requirements of the above documents, which are an integral part of this Project Document and are available online at www.undp.org.
- e. In the event that an investigation is required, UNDP will conduct investigations relating to any aspect of UNDP program and projects. Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient will provide its full cooperation, including making available personnel, relevant documentation, and granting access to its (and its consultants', subcontractors' and sub-recipients') premises, for such purposes at reasonable times and on reasonable conditions as may be required for the purpose of an investigation. Should there be a limitation in meeting this obligation, UNDP shall consult with it to find a solution.
- f. Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient will promptly inform UNDP as the Implementing Partner in case of any incidence of inappropriate use of funds, or credible allegation of fraud or corruption with due confidentiality.

Where it becomes aware that a UNDP project or activity, in whole or in part, is the focus of investigation for alleged fraud/corruption, each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient will inform the UNDP Resident Representative/Head of Office, who will promptly inform UNDP's Office of Audit and Investigations (OAI). It will provide regular updates to the head of UNDP in the country and OAI of the status of, and actions relating to, such investigation.

- g. UNDP will be entitled to a refund from the responsible party, subcontractor or sub-recipient of any funds provided that have been used inappropriately, including through fraud or corruption, or otherwise paid other than in accordance with the terms and conditions of this Project Document. Such amount may be deducted by UNDP from any payment due to the responsible party, subcontractor or sub-recipient under this or any other agreement. Recovery of such amount by UNDP shall not diminish or curtail any responsible party's, subcontractor's or sub-recipient's obligations under this Project Document.

Where such funds have not been refunded to UNDP, the responsible party, subcontractor or sub-recipient agrees that donors to UNDP (including the Government) whose funding is the source, in whole or in part, of the funds for the activities under this Project Document, may seek recourse to such responsible party, subcontractor or sub-recipient for the recovery of any funds determined by UNDP to have been used inappropriately, including through fraud or corruption, or otherwise paid other than in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Project Document.

Note: The term “Project Document” as used in this clause shall be deemed to include any relevant subsidiary agreement further to the Project Document, including those with responsible parties, subcontractors and sub-recipients.

- h. Each contract issued by the responsible party, subcontractor or sub-recipient in connection with this Project Document shall include a provision representing that no fees, gratuities, rebates, gifts, commissions or other payments, other than those shown in the proposal, have been given, received, or promised in connection with the selection process or in contract execution, and that the recipient of funds from it shall cooperate with any and all investigations and post-payment audits.
- i. Should UNDP refer to the relevant national authorities for appropriate legal action any alleged wrongdoing relating to the project or program, the Government will ensure that the relevant national authorities shall actively investigate the same and take appropriate legal action against all individuals found to have participated in the wrongdoing, recover and return any recovered funds to UNDP.
- j. Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient shall ensure that all of its obligations set forth under this section entitled “Risk Management” are passed on to its subcontractors and sub-recipients and that all the clauses under this section entitled “Risk Management Standard Clauses” are adequately reflected, *mutatis mutandis*, in all its sub-contracts or sub-agreements entered into further to this Project Document.

XII. LEGAL CONTEXT

This project document shall be the instrument referred to as such in Article 1 of the Standard Basic Assistance Agreement between the Government of Libya and UNDP signed on 20 May 1976 . All references in the SBAA to “Executing Agency” shall be deemed to refer to “Implementing Partner.”

This project will be implemented by UNDP Libya (“Implementing Partner”) in accordance with its financial regulations, rules, practices and procedures only to the extent that they do not contravene the principles of the Financial Regulations and Rules of UNDP. Where the financial governance of an Implementing Partner does not provide the required guidance to ensure best value for money, fairness, integrity, transparency, and effective international competition, the financial governance of UNDP shall apply.

XIII. COMMUNICATIONS

Any promotional communications undertaken by UNDP about the project, including press releases or online social media posts, will acknowledge the generous support and funding provided by the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

However, given the sensitivity of the subject of PVE, particularly the way it is framed, it is critical to design and undertake any online communications activity on the project in conversation and agreement with UNDP’s key partners. As such, UNDP will adopt an adaptive approach, where online social media posts about the project may be minimal depending on the political and security environment in Libya at the time of implementation.

UNDP also recognizes that communications from international entities pertaining to P/CVE and the involvement of Libyan women (or local CSOs) also remains particularly sensitive, and wishes to

avoid raising any local concerns or (mis)perceptions over their instrumentalization within broader militarized CT efforts, which could put their safety and community relationships at risk. As such, UNDP will not seek to expressly promote women's involvement in PVE programming in its online communications activity in line with the 'do no harm' approach. If it does decide to do so, the communications material will be designed in collaboration with or signed off on by the resident (Libyan) UNDP Gender Advisor.